

THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS
Financial Crimes Division

CN: FR/L38/2025

In the matter of:

The Financial Crimes Commission

V

Marie Priscilla Daniella ANTOO

SENTENCE

The accused stands convicted in respect of 43 counts as follows:

Counts 1 to 31: with willfully, unlawfully and criminally being in possession of property which, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented the proceeds of a crime in breach of **sections 3(1) (b), 6 and 8 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act.**

Counts 32 to 43: with willfully, unlawfully and criminally engaging in a transaction that involved property which, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented the proceeds of a crime in breach of **sections 3(1) (a), 6 and 8 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act.**

She was represented by Mr Teeluckdharry.

During the pre-sentence hearing, the statements recorded from the Accused were read and produced. As part of mitigation, she stated from the dock that she had health issues and various personal problems at the material time. She has a son of 8 years old and actually living with her parents. She is the sole breadwinner. She prayed for excuse and promised not to repeat same.

Section 8 of the FIAMLA provides for a fine not exceeding 2 million rupees and to penal servitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.

In **M N Toolsy v The State 2012 SCJ 410**, the Supreme Court referred to **Queen [1981] 3 Cr App R at page 246** where the Court of Appeal stated that:

"The proper way to look at the matter is to decide a sentence which is appropriate for the [instant] offence ... Then in deciding whether that sentence should be imposed or whether the court can extend properly some leniency to the prisoner, the court must have regard to those matters which tell in his favour; and equally to those matters which tell against him, in particular his record of previous convictions."

Learned Counsel for the defence submitted that the court should impose a non-custodial sentence in view of her timely guilty plea, personal factors, genuine remorse expressed by her and the delay which occurred.

I have considered that the accused have offered a timely guilty plea, which in view of **Section 69B of The District and Intermediate Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act** is, a mitigating factor. I also take into account all other factors which tell in her favour including her expression of remorse and her personal situation.

But on the other hand, I have given due consideration to the seriousness which the offences deserve. On various occasion, whilst being the HR Manager of Techmode Outsourcing Ltd, she was found in possession of money from illicit source and made some transactions involving the illicit money. As representative of the Company, she sold various vehicles belonging to the Company to third party and appropriated the money. The amount varies in respect of each count from Rs 2,000 to Rs 300,000, making a total of more than Rs 2,800,000.

I also bear in mind that the accused has a previous conviction for embezzlement by person on wages, dated 2012, met with non-custodial sentence, though not cognate, relates to dishonesty.

I find relevant to quote the following from **Abongo v The State 2009 SCJ 81**, with regard to the rationale of sentencing measures:

"The Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act was enacted essentially for the purpose of combating money laundering offences which had the potential of adversely affecting the social and economic set up, both at national and international level to such an extent that they may constitute serious threats not only to the financial system but also to national security, the rule of law and the democratic roots of society. By enacting sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Act, the policy of the legislator was clearly designed to achieve the compelling objective of safeguarding the national and international financial systems against any disruptive intrusion which may be caused by the perpetrators of certain criminal activities."

In the case of **M C Laval & Anor v ICAC and The State 2013 SCJ 431**, A. Caunhye and N. Matadeen JJ. endorsed the totality principle. The court found that:

"Quite significantly, the total amount of money which each of the two appellants had received as proceeds of drug crimes exceeded by far the total amount of the fine which was inflicted in respect of all the offences for which they were convicted. There is thus no merit in the argument that the totality of the fines inflicted on each of the first and second appellants was manifestly harsh and excessive."

This kind of transaction was certainly amongst those targeted when the FIAMLA was enacted. I however consider that the scale is lesser and is nothing as compared to large level of criminal activities. Taking into account the circumstances of the offence, the amount involved in respect of each count, together with the penalty provided and the mitigating factors as highlighted above, I consider that a fine is more appropriate.

Count 1: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees.

Count 2: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 30,000 rupees.

Count 3: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 2,000 rupees.

Count 4: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 2,000 rupees.

Count 5: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees.




Count 6: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 7: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 8: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 9: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 10: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.
Count 11: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 30,000 rupees.
Count 12: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees.
Count 13: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 14: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 15: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees.
Count 16: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 17: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 18: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 19: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 2,000 rupees.
Count 20: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 21: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 22: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 23: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees.
Count 24: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 25: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 26: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 27: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 28: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 29: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 30: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 31: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 32: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 3,000 rupees.
Count 33: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees.
Count 34: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 35: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 4,000 rupees.
Count 36: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.
Count 37: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.

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Count 38: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 39: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 5,000 rupees.
Count 40: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 15,000 rupees.
Count 41: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 40,000 rupees.
Count 42: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.
Count 43: I sentence the Accused to pay a fine of 20,000 rupees.

The accused is ordered to pay 500 rupees as costs.

The Prohibition Order lapses after satisfaction of sentence and delay of appeal.



B.R.Jannoo- Jaunbocus (Mrs.)
President
Financial Crimes Division
Intermediate Court
This 22nd December 2025.